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REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
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MOSCOW, USSR

MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 1988 - 5:45 p.m (Moscow Time) - 9:45 a.m. (EDT)

"PROSPECTS FOR THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE"

I AM PLEASED TO SPEAK HERE TODAY IN MOSCOW, AND TO ADVANCE ANOTHER STEP THE DIALOGUE IN WHICH OUR TWO NATIONS ARE ENGAGED. I ESPECIALLY WANT TO THANK MY HOSTS FOR PROVIDING ME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY. THIS IS, OF COURSE, MY SECOND VISIT TO MOSCOW IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS. I EXPECT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH MINISTER YAZOV AND IN THE OTHER EVENTS ON OUR AGENDA TO ADD TO MY UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET THINKING ON SECURITY ISSUES, ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.--AND TO DEEPEN AS WELL MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM.

MY INTENT TODAY IS TO SPEAK ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR OUR ON-GOING DIALOGUE ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES--WHERE WE ARE NOW, AND HOW WE CAN EXPECT THIS DIALOGUE TO DEVELOP. YET IN LIGHT OF THE INSIGHTS I WILL GAIN INTO THE SOVIET SYSTEM DURING MY VISIT, I WANT TO BEGIN MY REMARKS TODAY BY SHARING WITH YOU A FEW OF MY OWN OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, AND ABOUT THE IDEALS AND INTERESTS THAT SHAPE U.S. POLICY.

I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY OF YOU HAVE SPENT TIME STUDYING HOW THE AMERICAN SYSTEM WORKS. I COMMEND YOU IF YOU HAVE MADE THE EFFORT. FROM MY POSITION AS A PARTICIPANT WITH MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNMENT, I AM STILL LEARNING HOW THE AMERICAN SYSTEM WORKS EVERY DAY.

WHAT IS IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT IS THE PROFUSION OF "PLAYERS"--AS WE SAY IN WASHINGTON--INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS. THERE IS THE PRESIDENT, THE CABINET, THE CONGRESS, THE COURT SYSTEM; THERE ARE STAFF ADVISORS, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, COMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEES, AND, OF COURSE, THE BUREAUCRACY. OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT IS THE PARTY OUT OF POWER, THE ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND ASSOCIATIONS, ADVOCATES AND EXPERTS OF ALL SORTS. THEN THERE IS THE PRESS--REPORTING, EXPLAINING, COMMENTING ON AND QUESTIONING EVERY POLITICAL DECISION THAT IS

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MADE, OR EVEN IN THE MAKING. THE FORMULATION OF ANY ONE POLICY CAN QUITE OFTEN INVOLVE A DOZEN DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS, AND HUNDREDS OF INDIVIDUALS. AND EVEN WHEN A DECISION IS REACHED, ISSUES HAVE A WAY OF NEVER SEEMING SETTLED.

BUT THE APPEARANCE THAT, IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, THE NORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IS A STATE OF FLUX CAN BE DECEIVING. THE SYSTEM DOES WHAT IT WAS DESIGNED TO DO AND--ABOVE ALL--IT IS OPEN: THERE IS MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY FOR ANY AND ALL OPINIONS AND POINTS OF VIEW TO BE ADVANCED, AND ACTED ON. AND THAT OPENNESS IS AT THE HEART OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

IN ANY SYSTEM OTHER THAN ONE-MAN RULE, THERE IS DEBATE AMONG THOSE WHO GOVERN ON WHAT COURSE OF ACTION TO TAKE--THOUGH THAT DEBATE CAN EASILY BE HIDDEN FROM PUBLIC VIEW. WHEN THE PEOPLE GOVERN, THE PUBLIC ITSELF BECOMES AN OPEN-AIR FORUM WHERE THE ISSUES OF STATE ARE DECIDED. MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED FIFTY YEARS AGO, A VERY INSIGHTFUL STUDENT OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS NAMED ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE CAME TO AMERICA TO SEE DEMOCRACY AT WORK. THE FIRST THING HE RECORDED IN HIS JOURNAL WAS THE CONSTANT CLAMOR HE FOUND IN AMERICA. EVERYWHERE HE WENT, HE FOUND PEOPLE ENGAGED IN PUBLIC DISPUTES, NOISILY DISAGREEING WITH ONE ANOTHER. IN TIME TOCQUEVILLE REALIZED THAT WHAT HE HAD AT FIRST TAKEN AS EVIDENCE OF A PEOPLE DEEPLY DIVIDED AND IN DISARRAY WAS IN FACT DEMOCRATIC DEBATE--THE SOUND OF PEOPLE GOVERNING THEMSELVES.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT ABOUT THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IS THAT ALL OUR DIVERSITY HAS A COMMON ROOT--IN THE FREEDOM THAT BELONGS TO EVERY INDIVIDUAL.

FREEDOM IS THE BEDROCK PRINCIPLE THAT DEFINES DEMOCRACY, AND GIVES DIRECTION TO AMERICAN POLICY. OUR SECURITY POLICY IS BUILT UPON OUR COMMITMENT TO PRESERVE OUR FREEDOM, IN ALLIANCE WITH OTHER FREE NATIONS. OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS GUIDED BY A RESPECT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. AMERICA IS NOT MILITARILY AGGRESSIVE, BECAUSE DEMOCRACY IS NOT A DOCTRINE THAT CAN BE IMPOSED BY FORCE. TO THE EXTENT A DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE CAN CHOOSE, THEY WILL WISH NOTHING MORE THAN TO LIVE IN PEACE, AND EXERCISE THE FREEDOMS THEY ENJOY. BUT THEY CAN AND WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE CERTAIN THOSE FREEDOMS REMAIN SAFE.

PERHAPS ONE DAY SOME OR ALL OF YOU WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AMERICA, AND FORM YOUR OWN IMPRESSIONS ABOUT ITS SYSTEM AND ITS PEOPLE FIRST-HAND. I HOPE OFFICERS IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY WILL HAVE A SIMILAR OPPORTUNITY IN THE USSR. THE PROGRAM OF MILITARY EXCHANGES MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV AND ADMIRAL CROWE HAVE DEVELOPED IS A PROMISING START.

I MYSELF AM HERE IN MOSCOW AS SOMETHING OF A STUDENT OF CURRENT EVENTS IN THE USSR. FROM ALL THAT I SEE, THERE IS A VERY SIGNIFICANT PROCESS OF CHANGE TAKING PLACE HERE. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, I HOPE TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE CHANGES NOW UNDERWAY.

AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MY MOST IMMEDIATE INTEREST IS HOW THIS PROCESS MIGHT AFFECT SOVIET MILITARY POWER--BOTH ITS CAPABILITIES, AND IN THE WAYS THOSE CAPABILITIES ARE PUT TO USE.

MORE

I AM INTERESTED IN SEEING:

- o WHETHER GLASNOST WILL EASE THE SECRECY SURROUNDING THE SOVIET MILITARY AS IT HAS BEGUN TO DO IN OTHER ASPECTS OF SOVIET LIFE;
- o WHETHER PERESTROIKA WILL RESULT IN A REDIRECTION OF RESOURCES AWAY FROM MILITARY PRODUCTION AND TOWARD CIVILIAN NEEDS;
- o AND IN GENERAL, WHETHER THE "NEW THINKING" NOW IN PROGRESS IN THE USSR WILL MEAN A RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND FORCE STRUCTURE, AND LASTING CHANGES IN THE WAY THE SOVIET UNION CONDUCTS ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS.

RIGHT NOW, THESE ARE INTERESTING--BUT BY AND LARGE OPEN--QUESTIONS. WE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO WAIT AND WATCH--AND WE WILL WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE WHEN WE SEE IT MANIFESTED IN CONCRETE TERMS.

LET ME USE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AS A CASE IN POINT. I HAVE FOUND DEFENSE MINISTER YAZOV, AND MANY OF THE OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS I HAVE SPOKEN TO, ARTICULATE AND WILLING--INDEED ANXIOUS--TO DISCUSS A SHIFT IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE TO A DEFENSIVE STRATEGY AND POSTURE. NONETHELESS, THERE ARE STILL A NUMBER OF UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN MY MIND REGARDING A SHIFT IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE.

FIRST, WE HAVE DIFFICULTY IN RECONCILING A DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE WITH WHAT WE SEE IN SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL STRATEGY AS AN EMPHASIS ON THE OFFENSIVE--ESPECIALLY ON SURPRISE AND MANEUVER. I REFER TO SUCH THINGS AS THE OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUP CONCEPT, FORWARD-BASED BRIDGING UNITS, AND THE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON TANKS AND ARTILLERY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SEE NO SHIFT OF EMPHASIS TO THE KIND OF FORCES TYPICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH DEFENSE.

WE ALSO HAVE DIFFICULTY RECONCILING THE USSR'S PLEDGE NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH YOUR CONTINUING EMPHASIS ON HEAVY ICBMs, SUCH AS THE SS-18. THESE MISSILES, IN OUR VIEW, ARE BEST SUITED FOR A FIRST-STRIKE AGAINST U.S. SILO-BASED SYSTEMS--A CAPABILITY MORE COMPATIBLE WITH A MILITARY DOCTRINE THAT EMPHASIZES PREEMPTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES.

I RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN FORCE STRUCTURE CAN TAKE TIME TO IMPLEMENT--BUT I AM EQUALLY SURE YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT NO PRUDENT MILITARY MAN WOULD ALTER HIS OWN POSTURE UNTIL HE SAW EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL CHANGE.

I HAVE ALSO BEEN URGED BY YOUR LEADERSHIP TO EXAMINE SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISES FOR SIGNS OF A NEW DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS. NOW, IT IS TRUE THAT WE CAN LEARN FROM YOUR EXERCISES, JUST AS YOU LEARN FROM OURS. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, WHILE THERE ARE SOME CHANGES, THE SIGNS ARE AMBIGUOUS. WE HAVE NOTED EXERCISES WHERE SOVIET FORCES REPULSE AN ATTACK BEFORE GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE. YET IT IS HARD TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE FORCES DESIGNED TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK, AND THOSE MEANT TO LAUNCH A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE--A FACT POINTED OUT BY SOME SOVIET STRATEGISTS. WE WILL, OF COURSE, MAINTAIN AN OPEN MIND AS WE OBSERVE SOVIET EXERCISES IN THE FUTURE.

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LET ME AT THIS POINT SAY CLEARLY THAT THE U.S. HAS ABSOLUTELY NO INTEREST IN ADOPTING UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS IN REGARD TO SOVIET MILITARY RESTRUCTURING. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS, AND WE ARE AWARE OF THE SUFFERING YOUR COUNTRY HAS ENDURED IN THE PAST. NO ONE BEGRUDGES YOU THE NEED FOR A STRONG AND CAPABLE ARMY. WHAT TROUBLES US IS WHEN THE USSR CONTINUES TO DEVELOP FORCES FAR IN EXCESS OF WHAT IT NEEDS FOR PURPOSES OF ITS OWN DEFENSE --AND ESPECIALLY WHEN THAT NEWLY-ADDED STRENGTH FOCUSES ON FORCES DESIGNED FOR MASSIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO SEIZE AND HOLD TERRITORY.

AS WE ASSESS EACH OTHER'S MILITARY FORCES, WE NEED TO BEAR IN MIND THE GEOSTRATEGIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. THE SOVIET UNION IS A LAND POWER, VIRTUALLY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN STRATEGIC RESOURCES AND MATERIALS. AMERICA, IN CONTRAST, IS AN ISLAND NATION, NOT FULLY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN RESOURCES AND IN NEED OF DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST AMONG NATIONS IN ORDER TO PROSPER -- AND INDEED TO SURVIVE. THE U.S. NEEDS A LARGE NAVY TO ENSURE AMERICAN ACCESS TO THE SEA LANES THAT CONSTITUTE OUR LIFELINES TO TRADING PARTNERS, TO DETER AGGRESSION, AND HELP DEFEND COMMON INTERESTS WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS OVERSEAS. YOUR LEADERS ARE NOW URGING US TO REDUCE OUR NAVAL FORCES. BUT ASKING THE U.S. TO CUT BACK ITS NAVAL CAPABILITIES WOULD BE SIMILAR TO ASKING THE USSR TO TEAR UP ITS ROAD SYSTEM AND RAILWAYS: GIVEN OUR GEOPOLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES, NEITHER OF US COULD AFFORD TO CUT THESE VITAL LIFELINES.

OBSVIOUSLY, AS THE USSR DEVELOPS ITS ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE AND EXTENDS ITS AIR CAPABILITY OVER THE WORLD'S OCEANS, THE U.S. MUST IMPROVE AND TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT ITS OWN NAVAL CAPABILITIES, THROUGH -- FOR INSTANCE -- WEAPONS SUCH AS SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. AND YET OUR NAVY IS NO THREAT TO ANY NATION THAT DOES NOT ITSELF THREATEN US.

OUR POLICY IS ONE OF DETERRENCE. I KNOW THIS TERM SOMETIMES HAS HAD A PEJORATIVE CONNOTATION IN SOVIET MILITARY TERMINOLOGY, SO LET ME SAY PLAINLY WHAT THE TERM MEANS AS AMERICAN STRATEGISTS USE IT. DETERRENCE IS NOTHING MORE THAN OUR AIM TO CONVINCE AN ADVERSARY THAT AN ATTACK ON US WILL BE TOO COSTLY, CANNOT SUCCEED -- AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IS BEST NOT MADE. THIS UNDERSTANDING OF DETERRENCE IS AS FAR REMOVED AS POSSIBLE FROM A FIRST STRIKE STRATEGY THAT OTHER NATIONS WOULD RIGHTLY FIND MENACING.

OUR FORCE STRUCTURE IS OPEN FOR ALL TO SEE. WHILE WE HAVE A STRONG NAVY, IT IS SMALLER IN NUMBERS THAN YOURS. OUR ARMY HAS FAR FEWER TANKS THAN YOURS, OUR AIR FORCE HAS FEWER COMBAT AIRCRAFT, AND WE DEPEND HEAVILY ON RESERVE FORCES WHOSE MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS MAKE SURPRISE ATTACK EFFECTIVELY IMPOSSIBLE. AND THE U.S.--IN CONTRAST TO THE USSR--HAS A LIMITED CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM AND NO COMPARABLE DEEP UNDERGROUND SYSTEM OF BUNKERS, TUNNELS AND SUBWAYS TO PROVIDE SHELTER IN A PROTRACTED NUCLEAR WAR.

IN ASSESSING AMERICAN POWER, I ASK YOU ALSO TO NOTE THE OPEN WAY IN WHICH DETAILS OF OUR DEFENSE POSTURE ARE DISCUSSED. THE RESTORATION OF AMERICAN DEFENSE STRENGTH IN THE EARLY 1980s WAS A MATTER OF INTENSE AND VERY PUBLIC DEBATE--JUST AS THE FACT THAT THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET IS NOW IN ITS FOURTH STRAIGHT YEAR OF DECLINE IS NOT HIDDEN FROM PUBLIC VIEW. ONE YEAR AGO, IN A MESSAGE TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE CHAUTAUQUA CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT REAGAN CALLED ON THE USSR TO OPEN ITS OWN MILITARY PROCESS--TO PUBLISH A VALID MILITARY BUDGET, TO REVEAL THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF SOVIET FORCES, TO DEBATE PUBLICLY THE COURSE OF MAJOR MILITARY POLICIES AND WEAPONS PROGRAMS IN THE SUPREME SOVIET.

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BOTH YOUR GENERAL SECRETARY AND YOUR MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING YOUR MILITARY BUDGET PUBLIC. THAT WOULD BE A VERY WELCOME DEVELOPMENT FOR OUR ONGOING DIALOGUE. BUT AT PRESENT WE ARE OBLIGED TO MEASURE SOVIET MILITARY OUTPUT, AND--ACCORDING TO OUR BEST ESTIMATES --SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING CONTINUES TO CONSUME A FULL 15 TO 17 PERCENT OF YOUR COUNTRY'S GNP, AND CONTINUES TO INCREASE FROM YEAR TO YEAR. THE UNITED STATES, IN CONTRAST, DEVOTES 5.7% OF ITS NATIONAL WEALTH TO DEFENSE. ADMITTEDLY, OUR GNP IS LARGER, BUT IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS YOUR OUTPUT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT GREATLY EXCEEDS OURS.

I AM PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MANY AREAS THE U.S. ENJOYS A TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE OVER THE SOVIET UNION--AND I WILL SAY AS WELL THAT WE HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF FURTHER ENHANCING OUR TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES. WE REALLY CANNOT AFFORD TO DO OTHERWISE. WHEN, FOR INSTANCE, WE SEE THE TECHNOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES OF A DEFENSE AGAINST STRATEGIC MISSILES, WE MUST SEIZE THAT OPPORTUNITY IN HOPE OF ONE DAY DEVELOPING A MORE STABLE, DEFENSIVE DETERRENT.

WE KNOW THE IMPORTANCE YOU PLACE IN DEFENDING YOUR HOMELAND--AN INTEREST UNDERScoreD BY YOUR OWN INTENSIVE WORK INTO ADVANCED ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEMS SIMILAR IN MANY RESPECTS TO OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. THIS INTEREST IN DEVELOPING DEFENSES IS UNDERSTANDABLE, AND IT IS AN INTEREST WE SHARE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT SDI IS PURELY DEFENSIVE, AND DOES NOT REPRESENT THE SLIGHTEST THREAT TO THE USSR. IT IS DESIGNED FOR ONE PURPOSE ONLY: TO DEVELOP SYSTEMS THAT CAN DESTROY MISSILES LAUNCHED AGAINST US.

IN FACT, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE DEFENSES WE ARE BOTH RESEARCHING MAY ONE DAY HELP US SHIFT TO A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC REGIME BUILT ON A BALANCED COMBINATION OF DEFENSE AND OFFENSE. SURELY, A SYSTEM THAT INCORPORATES A DEFENSE AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK WOULD BE FAR SUPERIOR TO FOREVER DEPENDING ON A "BALANCE OF TERROR" INVOLVING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS ALONE.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT OUR ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WILL LEAD US TOWARD THAT GOAL. GREAT PROGRESS HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE. WHO WOULD HAVE THOUGHT FIVE YEARS AGO THAT WE WOULD TODAY BE IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD'S FIRST AGREEMENT ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS--THE INF TREATY--AND BE WELL ON OUR WAY TO AN EVEN MORE FAR-REACHING AGREEMENT REDUCING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 50 PERCENT? THERE ARE, OF COURSE, PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED, BUT THEY ARE BY NO MEANS INSURMOUNTABLE. THE KEY IS FOR BOTH OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS TO RECOGNIZE THE BENEFIT IN AN AGREEMENT THAT RESULTS IN A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE AT REDUCED FORCE LEVELS. IF WE APPROACH THE ARMS REDUCTION TALKS WITH THIS AIM IN MIND, I AM CONFIDENT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED.

I AM SPEAKING CANDIDLY TODAY BECAUSE I AM CONVINCED THAT CANDOR IS CONSTRUCTIVE. DIALOGUE, AFTER ALL, IS NOT VALUABLE IN AND OF ITSELF--BUT ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ENHANCES OUR SECURITY. AND THAT IS AN ARGUMENT FOR PLAIN SPEAKING ABOUT THE VERY REAL DIFFERENCES THAT DIVIDE OUR NATIONS, EVEN AS WE SEEK TO EASE TENSIONS AND IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS.

MORE

THE WAY TO ADVANCE THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE IS NOT TO PAPER OVER OUR DIFFERENCES, BUT TO FACE THEM SQUARELY, SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, AND BUILD ON IT.

LET ME FOCUS ON SOME OF THE INTERESTS WE SHARE, WHERE ADVANCES ARE POSSIBLE:

- o WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO FIND WAYS TO PREVENT DANGEROUS MILITARY INCIDENTS, THAT MIGHT SPARK A CONFRONTATION NEITHER OF US WANTS.
- o WE MUST CONTINUE TO ADVANCE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHERS' SECURITY CONCERNS THROUGH MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS.
- o AND, AS I HAVE MENTIONED, WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARDS ARMS AGREEMENTS THAT ESTABLISH STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS--IN BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

FINALLY, IN ADDITION TO THESE AREAS, WE HAVE IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP A COMMON INTEREST IN EASING TENSIONS AND THAT IS THE CENTRAL REASON THAT THE DIALOGUE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED--COVERING REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AS WELL AS MILITARY ISSUES--MUST CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD.

THE SIMPLE FACT THAT I AM HERE TODAY AT THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY INDICATES HOW FAR THIS DIALOGUE HAS PROGRESSED. AND YET IN SPITE OF THIS PROGRESS, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT A CULMINATION, BUT RATHER A BEGINNING. WHAT THIS DIALOGUE OFFERS IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROCEED--ON THE BASIS OF REALISM AND RECIPROCITY--TO EASE TENSIONS AND BUILD BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR NATIONS. THAT IS THE OBJECTIVE THAT HAS BROUGHT ME TO MOSCOW, AND THE ONE I WILL DO MY BEST TO ADVANCE DURING MY STAY HERE.

END